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10 Trade unions as political actors 
Wolfgang Streeck and Anke Hasset
1. Introduction
M odern  trade unions act in two arenas: the state and politics on the one 
hand , and the labour m arket and collective bargaining on the other. The 
relative im portance  o f  their econom ic and political activities differs 
between countries and  world regions, as well as historically and  between 
types o f  unions. So do  the way and the extent to which union action in the 
two arenas is coordinated.
The dom inan t kind o f  trade union as it emerged from the second postwar 
settlement after 1945 recognizes the primacy o f  the liberal-democratic state 
and o f  parliam entary  democracy, just as it accepts private property  and the 
principal rules o f  a socially em bedded and  regulated m arket economy. 
M ost unions after 1945 no longer claimed a right o r  reserved the op tion  to 
overthrow the government o f  the slate through a political strike. In this they 
paid tribute to the superior legitimacy o f  free elections, as com pared  to 
‘direct ac tion’ o f  the organized working class. Today m ore or  less explicit 
constitut ional law makes it illegal for unions in most liberal democracies to 
call a strike in order  to put pressure on the elected parliament, and m ost 
t rade unions have accepted this as legitimate. In return liberal dem ocratic  
states allow unions within the limits o f  usually complex legal rules to 
strike in the context o f  disputes with employers and in pursuit  o f  collective 
agreements on wages and working conditions.
In the n ineteenth century, syndicalist trad itions o f  the trade un ion  move­
m ent aimed at replacing the emerging national state with directly elected 
councils o f  workers, called sovjels in Russian and R ale  in G erm an .  
A narcho-syndicalist unions, which in countries like Spain survived into the 
twentieth century, pursued direct dem ocracy  o f  producers  as an alternative 
to bo th  the bureaucratic  territorial state and  the capitalist m arke t  economy. 
Such projects, however, cam e to naught and were eventually abandoned  in 
exchange for the legal and  constitu t ional recognition o f  collective ba rga in ­
ing and rights for unions to ac t  as organized interest groups within liberal 
democracy. While m any unions still keep a distance from ‘bourgeois 
dem ocracy’ and claim for themselves a special political status above that o f  
a mere lobbying group, this mainly rcllects the m em ory  o f  the class society 
o f  the past in which the d o m in a n t  political cleavage was that between 
capital and labour.
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Well into the 1980s and  1990s, E u ropean  un ions in p a r t icu la r  launched  
or were involved in political cam paigns  on  a varie ty  o f  m a tte rs  not 
directly related to their  m e m b e rs’ econom ic  interests, such as in te rn a ­
t ional peace or  free abor t ion .  In this they drew on  a b ro ad  concep t  o f  
worker interests in form ed by trad i t iona l  visions o f  class conflict and  by a 
syndicalist sense o f  rivalry with the  state over the  legitimate rep resen ta ­
tion o f  workers, no t  ju s t  as workers but also as citizens. Especially in 
Europe, un ions con t inued  for a long time to be expected by the ir  m em bers  
and  officials, and  also by intellectuals and  public  op in ion ,  to  be leaders in 
a general m ovem en t  for social progress, far beyond econom ic  m atte rs  in 
a narrow  sense. To an  extent this is still the  ease and  un ions  often  find it 
difficult to  reject expecta tions o f  this sort. Nevertheless, m os t  un ions have 
in recent decades increasingly concen tra ted  their  political activities on 
objectives related to those pursued  in collective barga in ing ,  such as 
general econom ic  policy, industr ia l  and  labou r  m arke t  policy, the public 
provision  o f  econom ic  in frastructure ,  including t ra in ing  an d  educat ion ,  
social welfare policy and  the ‘social w age’, and  n o t  least the legal f ram e­
w ork for collective bargaining, w orkp lace  represen ta t ion ,  and  t rade  
union ism  in general.
As political ac tors within the constitu tional framework o f  liberal d em oc­
racy trade unions can use various channels o f  influence. The m ost im p o r ­
tan t  o f  these are still un ions’ trad itional relations to  political parties. In all 
dem ocratic  countries unions are in some form o f  alliance with a major  
party  o f  the Left o r  the Centre-Left,  such as the S P D  in Germany, the 
L abour  Party  in Britain, o r  the D em ocratic  Party  in the United States. 
Often such relations go back to  co m m on  origins in the nineteenth  or tw en­
tieth centuries, in the context o f  a l a b o u r  m o vem en t’ organized in a polit­
ical and an  econom ic wing. Similar relations sometimes exist with Catholic 
parties o f  the Centre-Right.  In countries where collective bargaining is less 
firmly established, o r  a purely econom ic pursu it  o f  m em ber interests is for 
o ther  reasons less promising, unions may be dom ina ted  by allied parties, 
like in Italy o r  France. Mostly, however, the relationship is m ore balanced 
and  unions may exercise considerable influence over their political allies, 
serving as a recruiting ground for party  officials, con tr ibu ting  m oney to 
fund election cam paigns or cover the cu rren t  costs o f  party  organization, 
and  mobilizing their m em bers  to vote for the par ty  in general elections. 
U nions m ay increase their political clout if they can credibly threaten  to 
shift their su p p o r t  to a com peting  party, for example from a social- 
dem ocratic  to  a centre-right party. This, however, requires n o t  ju s t  a  high 
degree o f  political and ideological independence but also a suitable polit i­
cal oppor tun i ty  structure. While the G e rm a n  D G B  may sometimes ally 
itself  with the C hris t ian -D em ocra tic  Party  if the Social D em ocrats  disre­
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gard  its dem ands,  the British T U C  has no o ther  par ty  th a n  L abour  to turn 
to as the British Conservatives will not deal with them.
Im p o rtan t  sources o f  political strength o f  unions are paras ta te  public 
inst itutions o f  functional representation tha t  include unions in their 
governance structures. Examples are social security or  labour  m arke t policy 
funds under  the shared contro l o f  unions, employers and, in some cases, the 
state. Even where such funds are governed by law, they enable unions to 
influence the im plem enta tion  o f  public policies. They  also olfer em ploy­
m ent opportun it ies  for union activists and  opportun it ies  for m em bersh ip  
recruitment. G overnm ents  trying to  control the political power o f  unions 
or  to retaliate for unions not supporting  their  policy may sometim es under­
take to  eliminate functional representation and  replace it with state control.
M ost econom ists regard unions as econom ic actors, especially as labour 
m arke t  monopolists.  Political scientists, by com parison ,  treat unions as 
interest groups, emphasizing their political activities and their relations to 
political parties. For industrial relations scholars, the political activities o f  
unions are an aspect, o f  different im portance  in different countries, o f  their 
partic ipation  in tr iparti te  industrial rule m aking. H istorical-institutionalis t 
approaches look at the ways in which un ions evolved in opposit ion  to  the 
m odern  state and  in alliance with political parties o f  the working class or 
o f  religious minorities; pas t  origins are drawn upon  to  explain present 
differences in un io n s’ political status and political strategies. S tudents  o f  
neo-corporatism  consider  un ions as institutionalized interest groups with 
m ore or  less co rporatis t  organizational characteristics and  acting m ore or 
less in concert with the government; to them  industrial relations is one 
arena am o n g  others where selected interest organizations are ins t i tu t ional­
ized and  endowed with special rights and  obligations by the state. Theorists  
o f  collective action m ake little difference between political and  econom ic 
activities as in either case, organizations m ust  llnd ways o f  offering outside 
inducem ents  to rational individuals to overcome inherent free-rider p r o b ­
lems.
2. Historical origins of union political behaviour
Union political behaviour today is shaped by the economic, political and 
legal conditions in which unions first organized (Streeck, 1993a). W hether  
unions becam e reformist o r  radical depended  on two factors: ‘first the 
nature  o f  the social class system before industrialization; second the way 
econom ic and  political elites responded to the d em ands  o f  workers for the 
right to  participate in the polity and econom y’ (Lipset, 1982, p. 1). M o d e rn  
unions evolved in symbiosis with the nation-state, which first contested  and 
later protected their r ight to  organize. Liberal and in terventionist state t r a ­
ditions, conditioned  in p a r t  by the time and  pace o f  industrialization,
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shaped the organizational I'orm o f  t rade unions as well as their relationship 
to  political parties. Early patterns  of  union involvement in politics, as dis­
tinguished from collective bargaining with employers, n o t  only affected the 
extent to  which national unions achieved control over their local and sec­
toral constituents,  bu t  also prefigured the eventual relationship between 
industrial relations and state social policy in the constitu t ion  o f  m ature  
nation-states.
M ore specifically, in liberal environm ents where the general extension of  
the right to vote preceded or  coincided with the onset o f  industrialization, 
unions remained independent from political parties and  hostile to political 
ideologies. This went together  with organizational f ragm entation  and an 
overwhelming preference for industrial over political action. Over time in 
such countries, union political independence evolved into a pattern  o f  pri­
marily vo lun ta ry  and particularistic, as opposed to s ta tu tory  and universa- 
listic, regulation o f  em ploym ent conditions, accom panied  by a pattern o f  
state abstention  from social policy or  intervention in labour law. By co m ­
parison, in states tha t took an active and,  usually, au tho r i ta r ian  role in the 
industrialization o f  their societies, unions typically had  to  struggle for uni­
versal suffrage as a p recondition  for the achievement o f  effective organiz­
ing rights; this often resulted in their subord inat ion  to an  allied political 
party, as well as in their politicization and centralization. W ith improved 
econom ic and legal opportun it ies  for collective bargaining, political unions 
o f  this sort m ore or  less m anaged to escape from party  tutelage while not 
losing their  capacities for political action and centralized coordina tion .  
When union-friendly political parties were voted into government, such 
unions had  the oppo r tu n i ty  to com bine encom passing  collective ba rga in ­
ing with a political quest for a universalistic social policy, engaging in 
industrial and political action s im ultaneously and  deploying one in support  
of the other. For example, just as unions could use their influence on social 
policy to improve their position in relation to employers in collective b a r ­
gaining, they could draw on their role in collective bargaining to  defend 
their independence from allied parties and,  by extension, the state. In p a r ­
ticular, jo in t  understandings with em ployers on  the range o f  issues to  be 
regulated ‘vo luntarily’ by collective agreem ent ra ther  than by governm ent 
statute, constitu ted  an im p o r ta n t  resource for political unions defending 
their jur isd ic tion  against state intervention.
In early industrializing countries with a relatively liberal political system, 
repression o f  unionism was weak and  union organizing rights were c o m ­
paratively easily gained (Bartolini, 2000, p. 244ff; C rouch, 1993). T he  first 
British unions were occupational associations o f  a highly skilled labour 
aristocracy (‘craft un ions’). Being able to  achieve their econom ic objectives 
on their own by relying on their s trong position in the market,  unions o f
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this sort had no dem ands  on the state apar t  from non-inlerferencc in their 
o rganizing activities, which were typically based on the closed shop and 
included control over skill formation. In particular, they had little need for 
governm ent social policy as they preferred to negotiate their wages and 
benefits directly with their employers and were prosperous enough to build 
their own social insurance funds on a vo lun tary  basis. General unions of  
unskil led ‘mass w orkers’ emerged much later and a lthough  they co m ­
m anded  considerably less m arke t power, they had to organize and act under 
political,  institu tional and  ideological conditions that for a long time co n ­
tinued to be controlled by their predecessors.
C raft unions originally had no need for political ac tion  as liberal suppo r t  
for union organizing rights was all they required from the state. W hen later, 
after long hesitation, British unions did resolve to engage in cont inuous  
political activity, they set up the L abour Party  as their extended a rm  funded 
and formally controlled by the Trades Union Congress (von Beyme, 1977). 
As predicted by the opponen ts  o f  direct union engagem ent with polities, 
unions often turned out unable to m ake the par l iam en tary  L abour  Party 
follow its directions. Given tha t British un ions never developed a coherent 
socialist ideology, however, this did not m atter  much as long as L abour  
remained com m itted  to  free collective bargaining and did not stray from a 
core welfare-state agenda. Moreover, their low degree o f  politicization p ro ­
tected British unions from the political divisions that tore apa r t  union 
movements on the European  Continent.
In the U SA, by com parison , craft unions were even m ore conservative 
and m ain ta ined  their dom inance  over the union m ovem ent even longer 
than in Britain (Lipset and Marks, 2000; F riedm ann , 1998; K atznelson and 
Zolberg, 1986). Well into the 1920s the m ainstream  o f  A m erican trade 
unionism remained hostile to state intervention in the economy, not to 
m ention  a s ta tu to ry  social policy securing benefits for workers tha t  well- 
o rganized cra ft  unions were able to  secure on their own through  collective 
bargaining. T he  unskilled unions o f  the C IO  tha t  grew in s trength only 
under  the New Deal in the 1930s soon turned into business unions and  after 
the Second World W ar at the latest, also relied on non-political collective 
bargaining as their principal m ode o f  action. A slightly different approach  
was taken only by the un ion o f  au tom obile  workers (UAW) which, with 
little success, held on  to  its dem and  for a universalistic social policy o f  the 
federal government, in par t icu lar  with respect to  the provision o f  health 
insurance. The only lasting result o f  the New Deal was the close rela tion­
ship it established between A m erican  trade unions and  the D em ocratic  
Party  o f  the then President, Franklin  D. Roosevelt.
In C ontinen tal Europe the re la tionship between unions and  political 
parties, and subsequently  between collective bargaining and social policy,
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was quite different from the A nglo-Am erican world (Kendall,  1975). 
Sweden is the m ain  example o f  a coun try  where delayed industrial devel­
opm ent,  with the associated lack o f  opportun it ies  for a successful pursuit  
o f  worker interest through the market,  resulted in unions being founded by 
a political party  o f  the Left rather  than ,  like in Britain, the o ther  way 
around. While in Sweden ju s t  as in Britain, unions were co rpora te  m em bers  
o f  the political par ty  o f  the working class, in s tark  con tras t  to  Britain this 
m ean t subord ina t ion  o f  the form er to the latter. It was only after collective 
bargaining had become firmly established in the late 1930s, under  the 
Salts jobaden  national agreement with the employers, tha t  Swedish unions 
gained a u to n o m y  from the primacy o f  the par ty  inside the labour move­
ment. This in turn  came after  the Socialist Party had become the hegemonic 
force o f  Swedish politics when in the early 1930s it broke a wildcat strike of  
construc tion  workers tha t threatened to underm ine the governm en t’s refla­
tion programme. C on tinu ing  Socialist dom inance  within Swedish unions 
resulted in a political division o f  the Swedish union m ovem ent as white- 
collar workers refused to  join the Socialist blue-collar unions and set up 
their  own federation after 1945 (Fulcher, 1991).
Political unionism proved even m ore  divisive in countries where, unlike 
Sweden, national politics included a s trong Catholic  element o r  where the 
Firs t World W ar led to a split in the political par ty  o f  the w orking class. In 
Italy and France, Socialist, C om m unis t  and Catholic  parties founded their 
own unions, setting in m otion  p ro tracted  conflicts between and  am ong  
unions and  parties over trade un ion unity, with un ions periodically jo in ing  
together and  then again breaking apa r t  (Friedm ann , 1998; Ebbinghaus, 
1995; Valenzuela, 1994), Politicization and  party-political control o f  trade 
unions was favoured in Italy by slow industrialization and by weak inst itu­
tions of  collective barga in ing  and a d o m in a n t  role o f  the national state in 
the economy, with strong clienlelistism and  centralism. To escape instru- 
m entalization for party-political purposes, for example in elections or  in 
conflicts over the com position  o f  the  nat ional government, I talian unions 
m ade  several a t tem pts  after 1945 to  merge across political divisions. 
Immediately after the war national federations were founded in Italy and 
France that included the former Socialist , C om m unis t  and  Catholic  unions. 
But these soon broke up, mainly under  A m erican pressure aimed at isolat­
ing the C om m unis ts  and ending  their alleged contro l over the united union 
m ovement. In Italy, several a t tem pts  at reuniting the union m ovem ent were 
m ade  beginning in the 1970s, but always tailed earlier o r  later when party  
strategists utilized industrial relations as an  addi tiona l political arena, or 
when unions required political patronage to score a success in collective 
bargaining. In France, the jo in t  effects o f  syndicalist and liberal-republican 
political trad itions and weak labour m arke t inst itutions created a similar
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effect o f  dom inance  over unions by political parties -  in particu lar  the 
C om m unis t  par ty  and  o f  union polarization. In con tras t  to  Italy, unions 
did no t benefit from  the  social unrest o f  the late 1960s, but: lost much o f  
their im portance  and  most: o f  their m em bers  in subsequent years.
Political unionism took a different path in G erm a n y  where industrial 
developm ent was faster than  in Sweden, Italy and  F rance  and where po lit­
ical repression hit the working-class par ty  m ore than  the unions 
(M om m sen  and  Husung , 1985). Already early in the twentieth century, 
Socialist unions were formally conceded strategic independence by the 
leadership o f  the Socia l-Democratic  Party. A con tr ibu ting  factor  may have 
been the early existence of  a s trong Catholic  union m ovem ent associated 
with the Centre  Party. Like Socialists, Catholics were suspected by the 
Bismarckian state o f  internationalis t  loyalties, which m ade  them , loo, a 
target o f  state repression. After the First World War, the Socia l-Dem ocratic  
and the Centre Parties together  became the pillars o f  the Weimar Republic 
and  the unions associated with them coexisted m ore or less peacefully. A 
C om m unis t  un ion wing emerged inside the Socialist, o r  Genera l,  unions 
but never achieved political relevance. T he  Nazis suppressed all unions in 
1933. A fter  1945, Socialist and  Catholic  unions set aside their differences 
and founded the D G B  as an independen t Einlm tsgew erkschaft n o t  o rg an ­
izationally affiliated to any political party.
T h a t  the D G B , unlike the CG 1L in Italy or  the C G T  in France, remained 
united may be explained by the insignificance o f  its C om m unis t  element, 
due to the confinem ent o f  G e rm a n  C om m unism  in the second postw ar 
G erm a n  state, the D D R . Form al party-political independence, however, 
does not prevent the DG B, from m ain ta in ing  a particularly  cordial rela­
tionship with the Socia l-Dem ocratic  Party  (SPD). A t  the same time, 
however, it allows it to m anoeuvre  between the S PD  and  the Christ ian-  
D em ocratic  U nion  (C D U /C S U ),  which grew o u t  o f  the form er Centre 
Party with its traditional p ro-union  element. While the great m ajor i ty  o f  
their officials sympathize with the S PD  and  presumably carry its m e m b er ­
ship card, G erm a n  industria l  unions try to  ensure tha t at least one m em ber  
o f  their national executive is a m em ber  or  confidant o f  the CDLJ/CSU. 
There are also som e union officials tha t are m em bers  o f  the post- 
C om m unis t  PDS, which afte r  G e rm a n  unity absorbed  the few 
C om m unis t  elements o f  West G erm a n  unions before 1989.
In Belgium, the N ether lands  and  Switzerland, the labour capital cleav­
age was cut across by conflicts between church and state. In a battle over 
political contro l ,  two com peting  sets o f  worker organizations and social 
milieus developed, one under  the leadership o f  the party  in the Socialist 
m ovem ent and  one under  the contro l o f  religious leaders in the Christ ian  
w orkers’ m ovem ent (Ebbinghaus,  1995, p. 83). In con tras t  to  A ustr ia  and
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G erm any, in the ‘consocia lionaFcoun tr ies  religious clcavages bccame inst i­
tu tionalized. C om plex p ar ty -u n io n  relations com bin ing  religious and 
political cleavages split the trade union as well as the party  systems and gave 
rise to complicated consensus-orientated  political arrangements.
In Japan , bo th  unions and working-class political parties were outlawed 
for a long time under  the au th o r i ta r ia n  developmental state o f  the decades 
after the IS/Ieiji Restoration. P arliam entary  dem ocracy  and  free collective 
bargaining became safely institutionalized only after 1945. Unionization  
proceeded rapidly in the imm ediate postw ar period and  in 1947, the 
Socialist Party took over the national government, only to be removed from 
office shortly  thereafter  by the Am erican military co m m and ,  on  the eve of  
a general strike. Subsequently  the national trade union confederation  
divided a long political lines and  national unionism  for m any decades 
remained a site o f  arcane ideological disputes between rapidly changing 
factions o f  the radical Left, unrelated to the realities o f  the workplace. 
There employers and the governm ent succeeded in establishing the princi­
ple o f  enterprise unionism. While this responded to  s trong interests o f  
workers to  have a say at their workplace, especially with respect to  the p ro ­
tection o f  ‘lifetime’ em ploym ent, it also de-politicized trade unionism and 
cu t  oil’the experience o f  workers at the workplace from the ideological dis­
putes between national trade union centres, which were mainly on matters 
o f  war and peace and  on the desirability o f  a fast transition  to 
C om m unism . N ational trade union centres continued to reconfigure 
rapidly through  m ost o f  the postw ar  years, w ithou t visible im pact on indus­
trial relations at the workplace. Enterprise union ism  and  the practical irrel­
evance o f  their politicized national confederations corresponded  to the 
absence o f  a public welfare state in the Japanese political econom y and  its 
internalization into the industrial relations and the em ploym ent policy of  
large companies. While Japanese unions were often effective in represent­
ing their m em bers  at the workplace, there was for a long time little o p p o r ­
tunity  for them for political action in suppor t  o f  their activities in collective 
bargaining, not to  speak o f  tr iparti te  political exchange at national level 
between unions, employers, and  the government. It was only in the 1980s 
with the form ation o f  Rengo a new ‘m o d e ra te ’ t rade union confederation 
ideologically n o t  com m itted  to  the Left that Japanese industrial relations, 
focused as they are on the workplace and the enterprise, became to some 
extent institutionally reconnected to  politics and  political activities.
In conclusion, the relationship between trade unions and political 
parties, and  the political arena as a whole, can be classified by two s truc tu ­
ral d imensions that evolved in the course o f  nation-build ing and  state for­
m ation  in the n ineteenth and twentieth century: the degree o f  political 
unity and  the degree of  politization of  trade unions (see F igure 10.1).
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Figure 10.1 Union -party relations
Political unity exists in countries where political tli(Terences within trade 
unions have not led to organizational fragmentation. The degree o f  polit- 
ization describes the extent to which trade unions are active in the political 
arena. Politically unified trade unions are the less politicized the more d o m ­
inant they historically were in relation to  political parties. D o m in a n t  
unions tend to be politically unified but fragmented a long  industrial,  occu­
pational or enterprise lines. Politically fragmented trade unions are always 
highly politicized. The more politicized trade unions arc, w hether  polit i­
cally fragmented or  not, the m ore encom passing  they are in industrial 
terms.
U nion  party  relationships have remained rem arkably  stable since the 
Second World War. Political cleavages were organizationally  frozen early in 
bo th  political party  and trade union systems. Still, there are long-term  ten ­
dencies towards unification o f  unions and  m utual independence between 
parties and  unions. Unification was m ost pronounced in G erm a n y  and
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Austria, where the entire trade union s tructure was reorganized im m edi­
ately after the war. Religious and political segm entation  lost in im portance 
in the N etherlands, Switzerland and  Italy, less so in France and  Belgium. 
U nion  party  links have generally become weaker over time, with trade 
unions and  political parties responding to  the evolution o f  their respective 
industrial and political environments.
3. Unions in the political process
Trade un ions may achieve political influence by converting industria l  into 
political power (Pizzorno, 1978). Political exchange o f  this sort  occurs 
where centralized unions com m and  strong barga in ing  power; where the 
ou tcom es o f  collective barga in ing  are decisive for m acroeconom ic perfor­
mance, in particu lar  with respect to m one ta ry  stability and em ployment; 
and  where the political survival o f  the governm ent depends on such perfor­
mance. Also, unions may insert themselves in the political process through  
privileged links  with an  allied political party, which may enable them  to 
achieve their industrial objectives m ore  effectively and  efficiently through 
political instead o f  industrial means. Where such links do  not exist o r  have 
a t tenuated ,  unions must try to achieve political influence th rough  electoral 
suppo r t  for the party  m ost  sym pathetic  to their demands. Third ,  union 
political power may derive from institutionalized collective representation 
on bipart ite  o r  tr iparti te  parasta te  o r  parafiscal agencies, such as labour 
m arket o r  social security boards. Presence on such forurns o f  fu n c tio n a l rep­
resentation  may enable unions to contro l the im plem enta tion  o f  public pol­
icies or  even veto changes in government policy. Functional representation 
is less formalized in regional,  sectoral o r  in ternational policy networks that 
often include unions to enhance their legitimacy o r  mobilize expertise. 
Finally, unions may like o ther  interest groups lobby parl iam ent and govern­
ment in the prepara tion  o f  legislation and  policy decisions; here it is im p o r ­
tan t  for unions, like lobbyists in general, to provide lawmakers with 
technical inform ation and , if  necessary, influence public op in ion  in favour 
o f  their preferred policies.
Political exchange
Until the end of  the 1970s, economic policy in postwar democratic capitalism 
was conducted on the premise that social stability and the electoral fortunes 
of  the government depended on politically guaranteed full employment. 
Keynesian methods of  macroeconomic management, however, increased the 
bargaining power of  unions as these no longer needed to worry about unem ­
ployment resulting from excessive wage settlements. Rising worker militancy 
fuelled by high growth, inflation and secure employment prospects made 
governments dependent on unions willing to act as ‘managers o f  industrial
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discontent’ (Flanders, 1970) and help them restore m onetary stability without 
having lo retreat from their commitment to full employment. In this situation, 
centralized and broadly based encompassing unions (Olson, 1982) were in a 
position to offer governments wage moderation in exchange for favourable 
social policies, such as higher pensions, or for improved institutional condi­
tions for unions in the industrial relations system, like extended participation 
rights at the workplace or centralization o f  collective bargaining.
Conversion o f  industrial into political power under  w hat cam e to be 
referred to as neo-corpora tis t  incomes policies enabled unions to get a wide 
variety o f  concessions from governments, including industrial,  regional 
and educational policy programmes, and  to wield extensive power over 
public policy (Lehm bruch ,  1984; Schmitter, 1977; Headey, 1970). But it 
also required unions to  discipline their m em bers  and  m ake them forgo 
shor t- term  for long-term benefits. To the extent th a t  m em ber  militancy 
reflected collective and  symbolic as much as individual and materia l grie­
vances, the transfo rm ation  o f  direct action in political negotiat ions 
involved a trade-off  o f  expressive identities against instrum enta l interests 
(Pizzorno, 1978). U nions engaging in neo-corporatis t  political exchange 
thus faced a double  risk o f  m em ber  opposit ion  and  uncontrolled militancy 
on  the one hand  and m em ber  de-m otivation  and apathy on the other. On 
the p a r t  o f  government, the concessions offered to unions in return for 
wage m odera tion  may in effect only have moved problem s in to  the future, 
via growing deficits in the public budget. A t the same time, while the price 
paid by governm ents for union cooperation  was often high, contro l o f  
union leaders over their rank-and-file remained tenuous at best and  fre­
quently  unions turned out unable to  deliver the wage m odera tion  for which 
they had collected political concessions.
'D emocratic class struggle’ and  party  linkages
C orpora tis t  political exchange in principle worked also with conservative 
parties, provided these were still com m itted  to the postw ar political o r th o ­
doxy o f  politically guaran teed  full em ploym ent. However, where as in 
Scandinavia social-democratic parties had achieved hegem onic contro l o f  
the state, an o th e r  conversion o f  industrial into  political strength o f  trade 
unions became possible under  which unions could increasingly rely on 
political means to achieve their objectives. According to Korpi (1983) this 
explains why the m ost  successful trade unions o f  their time had the lowest 
strike rates in the Western world, especially in com parison  to the United 
States with its very intense industrial conflict. Sweden in par t icu la r  was a 
coun try  where class conflict, far from having subsided or  ‘withered away’, 
had been transposed  into the political arena, where it was possible to extend 
the achievements o f  the labour  m ovement, not ju s t  to union members, but
346 International handbook o f  trade unions
to  society as a whole. As Swedish unions turned into a popu la r  movement 
closely identified with Swedish society and the Swedish people, they were 
able to organize an unm atched 80 per cent o f  the workforce.
In the 1960s and 1970s the ‘Swedish m ode l’ seemed to oiler a generalizable 
vision o f  democratic-socialist progress under a close alliance between pow ­
erful unions and a hegemonic socialist party  (Stephens, 1979). Subsequently, 
however, traditional un ion -par ty  links weakened even in Sweden, where an 
im portan t  contributing factor was the rise o f  politically unaffiliated white- 
collar unionism. In the United K ingdom after the failure of  the Labour 
government under Callaghan in the 1979 ‘winter o f  d isconten t’, the Labour 
Party began to regard its political dependence on the T U C  as an electoral 
liability and gradually extricated itself from it. In G erm any in the 1990s, the 
SPE) on several occasions distanced itself publicly from the unions, in the 
belief tha t this would improve its electoral fortunes. Generally centre-left 
political parties today take care not to appear  as extended arm s o f  trade 
unions whose m embership base is shrinking and whose policies are perceived 
by a growing share of  the public as serving only union members, sometimes 
at the expense o f  the rest o f  society. Nevertheless, social-democratic parties 
still require the votes o f  the union constituency and thus make considerable 
efforts to  gain union support,  especially before elections and during election 
campaigns (Western, 1997; Taylor, 1993).
As social-democratic parties m ust b roaden  their electoral appeal in a 
society tha t is becom ing m ore and  m ore heterogeneous, unions can no 
longer take it for g ran ted  tha t  they will necessarily ad o p t  and  carry  out the 
policies unions prefer (Taylor, 1989). Increasingly, therefore, unions must 
apply political pressure to  m ake social-democratic parties take their in te r­
ests into account. Such pressure is likely to be m ost  effective if unions can 
credibly threaten to divert their support ,  and the votes o f  their members, to 
a com peting  party. In addition  to  the actual existence o f  such a party, this 
depends on the extent to which union m em bers  and  constituents  follow the 
recom m enda tions  of  their leaders when casting their votes. As electorates 
tend to  become increasingly volatile, neither parties nor  union leaders can 
be certain to w hat extent unions will in fact be able to  deliver their m em bers' 
votes; indications are tha t this capacity  has been declining in recent years. 
T he  situation is similar for o the r  large organizations, such as churches or 
sports  associations.
G row ing  voter volatili ty increases the im portance  o f  cam paign  co n tr ibu ­
tions and  financial suppo r t  generally. D epending  on a c o u n t ry ’s cam paign 
spending laws, unions may invest considerable sums o f  m oney to  ensure 
that social-democratic parties first su p p o r t  their policies and  then win the 
election. For example, in G erm any  the trade union confederation  D G B  
mobilized an unprecedented am o u n t  o f  indirect cam paign contribu tions
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during  the election cam paign  o f  1998, to extract from the. S P D  a com m it­
m en t to undo  certain labour m arket reforms passed by the last Kohl 
government and to enable Schroder to  win the election, also with the 
suppo r t  o f  the union vote. A similar e/Fort was m ade  in 2002 to ensure 
S ch rö d e rs  re-election, after the Red G reen  governm ent had closed ranks 
with the unions on labour m arket and  social security reform.
Functioned representation
In m any  C on tinen ta l-E uropean  countries trade unions and employers are 
represented on national econom ic policy councils, which were set up  in the 
in te rwar years o r  af ter  1945, to provide for regular meetings and discus­
sions between labour, business and the government. For  instance, the 
N etherlands created a tr iparti te  Social and  Econom ic Council after the 
Second World W ar and similar bodies exist in Belgium and  Austria. Some 
o f  these have, usually narrowly circumscribed, constitu t ional rights to 
advise the governm ent or the parliam ent on m atters  o f  econom ic policy, or 
to be heard  on cu rren t  legislation. Moreover, trade  unions, usually together 
with employers and  sometimes also with the governm ent,  sit on the boards  
o f  a variety o f  quasi-public o r  paraliscal agencies adm inister ing  labour 
m arke t  policy or social insurance programmes. In p a r t  such agencies were 
created at an early time when national states incorpora ted  in their  c o m p u l­
sory social insurance program m es the friendly societies and  m utual aid 
funds founded for their m em bers  by unions and  small business associations 
in the n ineteenth  century. N o t to  be pushed aside, unions, sometim es sup ­
ported  by employers, insisted on being given a role in the adm inistra tion  o f  
the newly-created agencies, which in countries like G erm any  subsequently  
cam e under the ‘se lf-government’ o f  the ‘social p a r tn e rs ’. Bipartite and  tri­
parti te  bodies o f  this kind emerged in par t icu lar  in the so-called Bismarck 
countries where social insurance was funded through con tr ibu tions  o f  
workers and  employers rather than  by general taxes, w ith  the paraliscal 
agencies collecting and adm inister ing  such con tr ibu tions  providing for rep ­
resentation o f  those paying them.
Although involvement in the adm inistra tion  o f  social security p ro ­
gramm es sometimes offered unions rich opportun ities  for patronage, it is 
questionable how much political power unions derived from it. In countries 
where public unem ployment benefit is administered by the unions, under  the 
so-called G h en t  system, they use this as a device for recruiting and reta in­
ing members. This indirectly contributes to union power (Ebbinghaus, 2.002; 
Rothstein, 1992). However, levels o f  benefit and contributions are univer­
sally fixed by law, and unions and employers, far from having a veto, can 
influence them only through  the legislature. The same, with appropria te  
modifications, seems to apply also to the national economic councils that
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have survived from the postw ar years, or to an institution like the Econom ic 
and Social Com m ittee  o f  the European Union.
Unlike formal participation  in stale councils or quasi-public  agencies, 
informal inclusion o f  unions in sectoral, regional and international policy 
networks seems to  have become increasingly im por tan t  in recent years. 
New forms o f  governance below, within and  above the national state 
depend on bringing together  all concerned parties to collect expertise, 
provide for m utua l  inform ation on policy preferences, and increase as much 
as possible the legitimacy o f  join tly  devised policies. Ra ther  than conflict, 
policy networks em phasize cooperation  in the pursu it  o f  co m m on  objec­
tives and  the improvem ent o f  collective infrastructures that cultivate jo in t  
com parative advantage. A lthough  policy networks have no constitu tion  
and there are no formal rights to inclusion, in m ost  cases care is taken to 
ensure that unions participate, bo th  to gain the general support  o f  their 
m em bers  and to tap their expertise with respect to industrial development, 
t rain ing  and skill form ation,  em ploym ent,  labour law', work organization 
and the like (M arin  and  Mayntz, 1991).
Lobbying
As the links between unions and centre-left political parties have become 
m ore tenuous, and  formalized functional representation tends to  be pre­
empted by legislative activism and state intervention, unions trying to influ­
ence political decisions seem to depend m ore than ever on classical 
lobbying of  parliam ent and  government. Especially in international envi­
ronments, but also in national politics, the opportun it ies  for unions to  exer­
cise political influence seem to be becom ing similar to those o f  any o ther  
interest group, from farmers to environmentalists. In m os t  countries, 
unions have established procedural rights to  be heard by par l iam entary  
committees and  like bodies on im pending  decisions close to  their concerns; 
sometimes those rights exceed those o f  o ther  groups. Still, unions used to 
acting directly th rough collective barga in ing  or  th rough  political exchange 
based on their bargaining strength, th rough a closely related socialist party  
within an encom passing labour m ovement, o r  th rough  legally based func­
tional representation, may not be particularly  good  at shaping legislation 
from the outside or m ak ing  their cause attractive to the general public. 
Also, in many countries unions not carry m uch  favour in postindustrial 
m edia politics. N o t least, unions tha t  have traditionally  relied on o rganiz­
ing, mobilizing and negotiat ing  skills may take time to build up a capacity 
convincingly to  present expert knowledge to  bureaucrats  and legislators, 
and a pleasant appearance to the general public. Here  business firms and 
business associations co m m an d  considerable advantage over unions in 
their present condition.
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4. Unions and economic policy
Trade unions emerged in conflict with the econom ic liberalism o f  the n ine­
teenth  cen tury  as they tried to protect their  m em bers  from the fluctuations 
o f  the m arket economy. Partly in response to union pressures, national 
governm ents in the first ha lf  o f  the twentieth century  assumed responsibil­
ity for stabilizing the econom y and  p rom oting  econom ic growth and 
em ployment. Moreover, in the First World War, governm ents  intervened 
deeply in national economies, only to discover tha t  econom ic mobilization 
and the governance o f  the war econom y required the collaboration  o f  
union leaders. In m any countries these cam e to be co-opted  in positions of  
quasi-public authority. Also enlisted soldiers had  to be promised a better 
life in a fairer society upon  their return  from the battlefields, which entailed 
a com m itm en t to lasting state in tervention in the economy.
T h e  first postw ar settlement after 1918 involved concessions o f  ‘indus­
trial dem ocracy ’ and  the acceptance o f  free collective bargaining in many 
industrialized countries. However, national governm ents proved unable to 
stabilize their economies w ithou t causing high unem ploym ent,  and in 
m any countries the G rea t  Depression ended liberal dem ocracy  and  free 
trade unionism and  b rough t au tho r i ta r ian  regimes into power. A new 
labour  inclusive settlement based on a Keynesian full em ploym ent policy, 
which first took  shape in the New Deal in the United States and under  the 
British war cabinet, becam e the corners tone  o f  the political econom y o f  the 
West after 1945. T he  dem ocratic  capitalism o f  the ‘G olden  A ge’ entailed 
not only the legal recognition o f  trade  unions and the rise o f  the m odern  
welfare state, bu t  also the promise o f  an  econom ic policy in line with the 
fundam enta l  interest o f  workers in full employment.
Keynesianism  and the second post-w ar settlem ent
The Keynesian revolution in econom ic though t held o u t  the prospect o f  full 
em ploym ent secured through creation o f  aggregate dem and  by public 
authorities, rather  than  through reduction o f  costs by private enterprises 
u nder  the pressure o f  com peti tion . T he  Keynesian scenario, which was 
based on the assum ption  tha t nominal wages were rigid and  could not 
easily be adjusted, was attractive for governm ents since it integrated strong 
t rade unions and  collective bargaining as an empirical fact into econom ic 
theory. Keynesian ideas strengthened the role o f  the state in econom ic 
policy by holding it responsible for providing for counter-cyclical dem and  
whenever the econom y required new stimulus.
in theory, Keynesianism did no t entail trade union participation  in 
econom ic policy, n o r  did it require detailed econom ic p lanning. In practice, 
however, m any E uropean  governm ents after 1945 tried to plan their econ ­
omies to  avoid a repetition o f  the politically disruptive econom ic crisis o f
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the interwar years. In France, the coun try  where p lanning  becam e most, for­
malized, union influence on the plan was low. N either  governm ent n o r  busi­
ness was interested in discussing econom ic policy with trade  unions 
(Barbash ,  1972, p. 149). In o the r  European  countries, p lanning  was co n ­
ceived as a policy instrum ent tha t was deliberately m ean t to  integrate the 
labour m ovement, especially in order  to  m odera te  wage dem ands. In such 
countries, econom ic p lanning  was used to  constra in  free collective ba rga in ­
ing. In the U K , p lanning took place in the framework o f  the N ational 
Econom ic D evelopm ent Council (N E D C )  under  a L abour  government. 
T rade unions were initially willing to partic ipate but were quickly disillu­
sioned by the complexity o f  the problem s and by the expectation o f  the 
government that they would in return  settle for lower wages.
In o ther  countries, consulta tion  on econom ic policy took  place outside 
formal councils. C oord ina tion  between t rade  union collective bargaining 
and governm ent econom ic policy was based on a m ore informal shared 
unders tand ing  o f  the m acroeconom ic interaction o f  wage setting and  eco­
nom ic policy. T he  Swedish Rehn M eidner model o f  ‘active m anpow er  
policy’ was developed in cooperation  between trade  unions and the govern­
ing Social D em ocratic  party, but not in a formal consu lta tion  structure. 
G overnm ents  encouraged trade  union wage restraint by offering growth- 
enhancing  public policies (Lange and  G arre tt ,  1985).
Econom ic policy problems in postw ar Europe were unlike those in the 
in terwar years. In the first decade after the war, wage growth was m odera te  
and capital stocks were being built up. After dem obilization and recovery 
had been achieved, ‘the m ain  difficulty o f  the post-w ar economies was not 
slack dem and, relative overproduction or insufficient investment, but an 
ungovernable tendency o f  dem and  to  ou trun  the econom y’s capacity  to 
meet: it w ithout inflation and price rise’ (Postan, 1967, p. 19). instead o f  
having to  stimulate dem and ,  governm ents  soon faced the task o f  con ta in ­
ing inflationary pressure. At the same time, they remained com m itted  to full 
em ploym ent and  free collective bargaining.
As a consequence, Western governm ents soon  found themselves facing a 
tr ilemma between full em ployment, price stability and free collective b a r ­
gaining, in which any two could be achieved only by sacrificing the third. 
The tradeoff  between unem ploym ent and price stability the so-called 
Phillips curve depended on the conduc t o f  collective bargaining. U nder 
the institutional conditions o f  a regulated labour m arke t and free collective 
bargaining, any decrease in unem ploym ent would lead to an increase in 
inflationary pressure (F lanagan  et a!., 1983; U lm an and  F lanagan , 1972, p. 
2 4). M acroeconom ic  policy had to  deal with the question o f  how to 
accom m odate  the effects o f  free collective barga in ing  w ithou t reducing 
employment.
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In this situation, incomes policies were considered a promising potential 
in s trum ent to  shift the Phillips curve dow nw ards and  p reem pt inflationary 
pressure. A t first, in the 1960s, incomes policies included the contro l o f  
prices and wages. A fter  price controls were d ropped  due to insuperable 
problem s o f  im plem entation ,  governm ents issued recom m enda tions  or 
o rdered wage freezes. A t  the same time unions were included in consu l ta ­
tion with governm ents on how to resolve balance o f  paym ent and other  
econom ic difficulties.
E conom ic m anagem ent became far m ore difficult in the late 1960s when 
labour unrest broke ou t in a large num ber  o f  countries, often in opposit ion  
to trade union wage restraint. By tha t time, the experiments with incomes 
policies were widely seen as a failure. Nevertheless, when the pos tw ar  polit­
ical econom y was put to the test o f  the devaluation o f  the US dolla r  and 
the first oil shock in the early 1970s, m any  governm ents  turned to  incomes 
policies again. Lacking alternatives, they app roached  t rade  un ions  for vol­
untary  tr iparti te  concerta tion  with the aim to contro l wage expectations. 
T h ro u g h o u t  the 1970s, there were frequent a t tem pts  to find cooperative 
approaches  o f  governm ents  and trade un ions to  deal with the  problem  of  
stagflation. In m ost  countries, public expenditure rose in o rder  to co m p en ­
sate for jo b  losses and  provide for the unemployed, bu t  also to provide a 
dem and  stimulus for the economy.
The rise o f  m onetarism
At the end o f  the 1970s, governm ents’ approach  to  econom ic policy 
changed drastically. Hesitation in the 1960s and  1970s to  use m one tary  
policy to dam pen  inflation was reduced by the success o f  the ‘G erm a n  
m ode l’. T he  G erm a n  B undesbank  switched to  a restrictive m one ta ry  policy 
in 1974. A t the end o f  the decade, unem ploym ent and inflation in G erm any  
were far below' the European  average. Moreover, the US government 
shifted its econom ic ad jus tm en t strategy in 1978/79, am o n g  o the r  things 
adop ting  a new policy o f  deregulation. The Federal Reserve Bank 
responded to the second oil shock with sharp  increases in interest rates and, 
given the in ternational natu re  o f  financial markets, forced the rest o f  the 
industrialized world to follow. In the U K , the newly elected Conservative 
governm ent in 1979 based its econom ic strategy on tight m o n e ta ry  policy 
and labour m arke t deregulation. The a t tem p t  by the French socialist 
governm ent in 1982 to stimulate growth by encourag ing  wage rises and 
increasing public expenditure failed within only a few months. In addition  
the E uropean  m one ta ry  system, set up in 1978, aimed at keeping exchange 
rate fluctuations within a narrow  band  and thereby m ade  ad justm ent 
through currency devaluation  much m ore difficult.
T h e  shift in econom ic policy was accom panied by changes in econom ic
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though t.  Whereas previously the Philips curve was widely accepted in eco­
nom ic theory  not on theoretical g rounds but on the basis o f  empirical 
facts rational expectations theory  questioned the tradeoff  between infla­
tion and  unem ploym ent.  In the long run, according to the new consensus 
in m acroeconomics, it was impossible to generate em ploym ent by allowing 
for higher inflation. Inflation was to be fought by t ighter m one tary  policies. 
Im balances in the real economy, such as unem ploym ent,  had to  be dealt 
with by improving competitive conditions on the m arkets  for goods and 
labour. To create em ploym ent,  policy makers should focus on the supply 
side o f  the economy and  on flexible ad jus tm en t o f  the labour market.
The new trend in econom ic policy potentially  underm ined  government 
cooperation  with unions. D eregulation threatened the role o f  trade  unions 
in the labour m arket.  R a ther  than  negotiat ing  jo in t  econom ic ad justm ent 
policies tha t com bined wage restraint with econom ic policies beneficial for 
labour, m onetarism  aimed at disciplining labour  by increasing unem ploy­
ment. A ccord ing  to  Scharpf, only in a Keynesian econom ic environm ent 
did governm ents depend on the willingness o f  trade unions to  engage in 
vo lun tary  wage restraint. If the governm ent switched to  a m one tar is t  s tra t­
egy, wage restra int no longer required trade  union cooperation .  Rather, 
excessive wage settlements were immediately  punished by unem ploym ent. 
U nem ploym ent,  unlike inflation, is experienced, no t as a collective evil, but 
as an individual risk. T rade unions have to  respond to  rising econom ic inse­
curity and  lower their wage claims (Scharpf, 1991).
As it tu rned  out,  the effect o f  m one tar is t  policies on the role o f  trade 
unions was n o t  as s traightforward as anticipated. Previous studies had 
pointed ou t tha t  (lie econom ic perform ance o f  countries varied with the 
level o f  centralization o f  wage bargaining institutions. In the classic version 
o f  the argum ent,  the effects o f  wage barga in ing  inst itutions were deter­
mined by two countervail ing  forces. Where centralized unions were in 
contro l o f  wage form ation  for the econom y as a whole, they were forced to 
internalize the negative effects o f  excessive wage settlements. In these cases, 
t rade union  behaviour in wage setting was m ore responsive to  changes in 
the econom y and  therefore had  a positive im pact on econom ic perfor­
mance. A t  the same time, the bargaining power o f  trade unions was higher 
in centralized wage bargaining structures. In decentralized bargain ing 
systems a local wage push by trade unions would be disciplined by co m p et­
ing non-un ion  companies. As a result , the rela tionship between econom ic 
perform ance and  the centralization o f  wage barga in ing  would take the 
shape o f  a h u m p  (Calmfors and  Driffill, 1988; see also C hap te r  6 by 
F lanagan  in this volume).
Elsewhere in the literature a linear re la tionship is assumed between wage 
barga in ing  centralization and econom ic perform ance, with perform ance
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improving with increasing centralization or  coord ina tion  (Soskice, 1990; 
Dell’A ringa  and  Sarneh, 1992). In decentralized wage barga in ing  systems, 
wage form ation  is said to depend on the condit ions  in local labour m arkets 
for par t icu la r  skills. Moreover, since wage s tructures are em bedded  in social 
no rm s abou t  fair relativities, even in decentralized wage form ation  relative 
wages tend to  be rigid.
Building on these argum ents,  it was shown th a t  wage barga in ing  insti­
tu t ions  also interacted with m one ta ry  policy (Iversen, 1999; Hall and 
Franzese, 1998). In countries  with decentralized wage bargaining, a c o m ­
m itm en t  o f  m o n e ta ry  au thori t ies  to a restrictive policy would have less o f  
an  im pact on  t rad e  un ions since local wage barga iners  would  n o t  perceive 
their wage se ttlements to be influential with respect to  m o n e ta ry  policy. 
Only in centralized wage barga in ing  are t rade  un ions able to  take into 
accoun t  the responses o f  m o n e ta ry  au thori t ies  tha t  their wage settlements 
m ight trigger. In countries with m ore  centralized wage barga in ing ,  unions 
are therefore expected to be m ore responsive tow ards tight m o n e ta ry  po l­
icies (see C h a p te r  6 by F lanagan  in this volume). In empirical studies it was 
shown tha t  countries  with sectoral wage barga in ing  tended to ad jus t  better  
to a m one tar is t  environm ent.  C oun tr ies  with decentra lized  wage fo rm a­
tion showed the w ors t perfo rm ance  (Traxler et al., 2001; Iversen, 1999). 
Also, the interplay between the B u n d e sb an k ’s restrictive m o n e ta ry  policy 
and  sectoral wage barga in ing  inst itu tions in G erm a n y  was seen us c o n t r ib ­
uting to  the relative success o f  the  G e rm a n  econom y in the 1970s and  
1980s (Streeck, 1994). T h u s  tight m one tar is t  econom ic  policy seemed in 
principle com patib le  with regulated labour  m arkets  and  centralized wage 
bargaining.
In line with these a rgum ents  abou t the persisting im portance  o f  wage 
bargaining institutions for econom ic performance, the postw ar t rad i tion  o f  
concerta tion  and trade union involvement in econom ic policy survived the 
turn  to  m onetarism  in m any countries. While restrictive m one ta ry  policies 
were eventually adop ted  in all advanced industrialized countries, this was 
not accom panied  by universal labour  m arket deregulation  and  trade union 
exclusion. Only in the A nglo-A m erican  O E C D  countries, with the excep­
tion o f  Ireland, did the labour-inclusive pos tw ar  political econom y d isap ­
pear in the 1980s and  1990s. In the USA, C a n ad a ,  New Z ealand , Australia 
and  the UK where labour inclusion and  econom ic p lanning  had  always 
been alien to  the political system, the tu rn  to  neo-liberalism and  m o n e ta r ­
ism excluded unions from econom ic policy making.
In C on tinen ta l  Europe, by com parison , many governm ents in the 1980s 
opted for negotiating wage restra int with unions and  employers when 
facing the challenges o f  tight money, fiscal austerity, and attacks on their 
currencies in international financial markets. A new wave o f  ‘social pac ts ’
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revived national traditions o f  coneerta tion  (Ebbinghaus  and  Hassel,  2000; 
Pajeriag and Pochet, 2000). Pacts also becam e an im p o r ta n t  policy instru­
ment in the transition  countries o f  Eastern Europe  (Schmitter and  Grote, 
1997). In all these cases, m one tar ism  improved the barga in ing  posit ion of  
governments vis-a-vis t rade  unions. In Europe, the M aastr ich t  Treaty and 
the subsequent Stability Pact imposed tight ceilings on inflation and  public 
spending. The Single E uropean  M arke t  liberalized product m arke ts  and 
intensified com peti tion .  G overnm ents  no t  only acted under  tighter co n ­
straints, but they were also in a better  position to convey this to  domestic 
interest groups.
5. Unions and the Welfare State
Trade unions played a m ajor  role in welfare state development by prom oting 
democratization and the evolution o f  social rights as a core element o f  citi­
zenship. Industrialization and m odernization both enabled and required 
public welfare provisions. They undermined pre-industrial sites o f  solidarity 
such as the extended family, the church and the guilds by advancing social 
mobility, urbanization and market exchange. As the expansion o f  markets 
tended to destroy the social com m unity  on which markets are based, social 
policy had to  re-embed the market economy into society. An obvious source 
of  provision for the needy was the state, which developed bureaucratic o rgan­
izations to deal with the new dem ands (F lora  and Alber, 1981).
The  evolution o f  the welfare state coincided with the emergence o f  d em ­
ocratic forms o f  state legitimacy. The provision o f  collective welfare 
th rough  public expenditure becam e a principal m eans for governm ents to 
secure the support  o f  an increasing group  o f  voters. Expansion o f  the f ran ­
chise moved the political agenda tow ards the institutionalization  o f  social 
rights. Full citizenship becam e based, no t  just on equality  before the law, 
but also on social equality  (M arshall ,  1965). A t  the same time, social policy 
often preceded full dem ocratiza tion  and in fact was used to  pre-em pt it. 
Also, early democracies were often slow to  in troduce comprehensive 
welfare systems because political power was cap tured  by small property  
owners cam paigning  for lower taxation  ra ther  than  higher welfare provi­
sions (Esping-A ndersen, 1992, p. 99).
While the expansion o f  the welfare state was a universal phenom enon  in 
the twentieth century, there are m arked  differences between different types 
o f  welfare state. Welfare regimes can be distinguished by the degree to 
which they protect the individual from the m arke t and  the social status o f  
individuals in econom ic hardsh ip  or  when their em ploym ent changes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). ‘D ecom m odification’ o f  labour can take differ­
ent forms and  entail different sorts  o f  entitlement in cases o f  sickness, 
unem ploym ent,  disability and  the like.
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Three welfare regimes were identified in a seminal study (Esping- 
Andersen ,  1990). Decommodification  is strongest in the social-democratic 
regime with universal provision o f  a wide range o f  entitlements. Social- 
dem ocratic  welfare states were designed to secure high s tandards  for all, 
and  no t just to su p p o r t  the needy. Their  political project was equality 
between the classes. Status differences between m anual and  white-collar 
workers were eradicated within a universal insurance system, a l though  ben ­
efits continued to be based on accustom ed earnings. Exem plary  cases are 
the Scandinavian countries of  Sweden, Norway, F in land  and D enm ark .  At 
the o ther  end, a liberal welfare regime developed in the Anglo-Saxon  c o u n ­
tries and  in a coun try  like Switzerland. Here welfare provisions are minimal 
and  means-tested, and the state encourages m arke t  so lutions by subsidiz­
ing private welfare schemes. Public schemes are universal but provisions are 
too  low for status maintenance.
Third, in conservative welfare states social security is provided mainly by 
the state and the share of  the m arket is minimal. Provisions and entitlements 
arc, however, not as comprehensive as in the social-democratic welfare 
regime; the emphasis is not on equality but on the preservation o f  social 
status. Redistributive effects are therefore negligible. Conservative welfare 
states are primarily to be found on the European  continent.
M any  countries com bine elements o f  different welfare regimes. The 
Danish  welfare state has liberal elements com bined with social-democratic 
ones. In the poorer  countries o f  sou thern  Europe, a mix o f  liberal and  co n ­
servative elements can be found. Different com binat ions indicate different 
relative im portance  o f  conflicting goals in social security provision: equa l­
ity, the m ain tenance  o f  s ta tus differentials, and  m arket reliance.
Unions and the Evolution o f  the Welfare S ta te
Trade union dem ands  for social security collided and interacted with the 
dem ands  o f  o ther  political ac tors in country-specific political constella­
tions. N ation  and state building, industrialization and  political cleavage 
s tructura tion  coincided with trade union organization and the evolution o f  
welfare stales (R okkan ,  1968). Welfare state intervention owes its origins 
‘to  an epoch that anteda tes  labo r’s emergence as a real political force’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 139). T hus  the evolution o f  the welfare state 
took  place in interaction between labour movem ents and  groups like 
farmers and business. While the presence o f  s trong farming com m unities  
often worked against welfare state expansion (Gourevitch , 1986), business 
could occasionally be draw n on la b o u r’s side. Several studies show a shared 
interest o f  em ployers’ associations and trade unions in the expansion  o f  
specific forms o f  social security provision (Mares, 2.000; Swenson, 1997). 
For instance, unem ploym ent insurance also serves interests o f  employers as
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it preserves the skills o f  workers during  econom ic dow nturns  (Marcs, 
2000). The ac tua l design o f  unem ploym ent benefits w hether  they are 
based on taxation or  on a comprehensive o r  narrowly defined occupational 
insurance scheme -  depended on the relative power and  the strategic 
behaviour o f  trade unions, employers and the government.
Trade unions were highly influential with respect to the direction of  
welfare state evolution in different countries. While expansion o f  social 
security was an obvious goal for all unions, m ore radical unions pressed for 
a political so lution beyond capitalism, in which social security would be 
par t  o f  a socialist econom ic order. Reformist labour m ovem ents  supported  
voluntaristic provision o f  social security by friendly societies rather than  
the state.
The type o f  social security provision trade unions dem anded  varied sub­
stantially with the type o f  trade unionism and its in teraction  with o ther  
political forces. A key factor  was the mix o f  craft and  industrial trade 
unionism at the time o f  the first period o f  social security expansion in the 
latter ha l f  o f  the n ineteenth century. C raf t  unions preferred particularistic 
solutions. N o t least to protect their own organizations, they insisted on p ro ­
viding social security themselves ra ther  than  letting the state take over their 
role. T h u s  they often experienced the growth  o f  the welfare state as expro­
priat ion and dilution o f  their own social security provisions. In countries 
where originally unem ploym ent benefits, sickness pay and  similar forms o f  
social insurance were provided by organizations o f  skilled workers, craft 
union dom inance  impeded the developm ent o f  universalistic social secur­
ity program m es with high levels o f  equality. Since the craft unions in the 
A nglo-Saxon countries were also less politicized than  the m ore encom pass­
ing unions o f  continental Europe, they did no t have the political clout to 
press for comprehensive social security. But even in D enm ark  the craft-  
oriented labour m ovem ent blocked social dem ocratic  initiatives for an 
active labour m arket policy like in Sweden and  Norway. In the United 
States and the United K ingdom , craft unions preferred occupational over 
universal benefits.
Industrial unions, by com parison , had a b roader  and  m ore heterogene­
ous m em bersh ip  and were under pressure from their m ajority  o f  low- 
skilled m em bers  to even ou t occupational differentials. As political unions, 
they also were better  able to bargain  with central governments. In countries 
where industrial unions became dom inan t ,  a wide range o f  social benefits 
are m ore likely to be provided by the state, achieved th rough  political 
mobilization instead o f  collective barga in ing  and  on the basis o f  universal 
rights o f  citizenship. In Sweden, unions pursued the levelling o f  s tatus and 
pay differentials between blue- and white-collar workers in social security 
as well as in pay bargaining.
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Political fragm entation  o f  trade  unions in continental Europe  u n d e r ­
mined support  for a social-democratic welfare state. The persistence o f  the 
religious cleavage in countries with segmented union par ty  relations 
shaped the norm ative  orien ta tion  o f  policy makers vis-à-vis the provision 
o f  social security. S trong ties between C hris t ian-dem ocratic  parties and 
trade unions encouraged policies based on the subsidiarity  principle. This 
emphasized the traditional role o f  women and the family and  tended to 
work against universal and  com prehensive social security provisions. 
Political conflict between com m unis t  and  Christian trade unions had a 
similar effect. In Austria and  G erm any, the origins o f  the welfare state 
reach back to a period o f  political division and oppression. Social security 
provision developed a long the line o f  status differentials and this changed 
only slowly in the postw ar period after the restructuring  o f  the trade 
unions.
There  is a close interaction and correla tion between the organization  of  
wage barga in ing  and  the evolution o f  the welfare state, mediated  by the 
degree o f  centralization o f  trade unions and  their politicization. The more 
encom passing  and  centralized trade unions were initially, the m ore they 
were able to influence the political econom y both  in wage barga in ing  and 
in social policy. T he  decom m odification  o f  welfare regimes is highly corre­
lated with the  centraliza tion of  wage barga in ing  (see F igure 10.2).
Unions and m ature welfare sta tes
As welfare states m atured  after the Second World War, the in teraction 
between unions and  the welfare state and between social policy, collective 
bargaining and  the labour m arke t changed. Over time, trade  unions learned 
to use the welfare state and  its expanding  provisions to  stabilize the income 
o f  their members. While political exchange between governm ents  and trade 
unions entailed wage restra int on the side o f  the unions, it often provided 
for the expansion o f  social security benefits by the government.
At the same time, welfare state regimes increasingly affected the perfor­
m ance of  labour  m arkets  and  trade unions grew dependen t on  the welfare 
state. First,  the welfare state becam e a big employer. In the mid-1990s, the 
social service econom y accounted for one q u ar te r  o f  total em ploym ent in 
Sweden (Esping-A ndersen, 1996). In the social-democratic welfare states, 
female labour m arke t participation  increased with the increase in em ploy­
m ent o f  the social security sector.
Second, the welfare state reduced em ploym ent by offering incentives to 
older workers to leave the labour market for early retirement. Participation 
rates o f  men above 55 declined on average in the EIJ by 27 percentage 
points, from 81 to 54 per cent, between 1970 and 1995. Beginning with the 
1970s when governments were no longer able to guaran tee  full em ployment,
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early retirement and similar policies were developed to lake care o f  red u n ­
dant workers. Early retirement was popu la r  with older workers, and there­
fore with trade unions whose mem bership  gradually  grew older on average 
(Ebbinghaus, 2001).
Third, social security expansion raised the price o f  labour. In insurance- 
based welfare states, non-wage labour costs have exploded since the early 
1970s. Since early retirement p rogram m es and disability pensions are paid 
out o f  contributions o f  those employed, unit labour costs increased while 
wages remained stagnant.  As non-wage labour costs began to make national 
economies non-competitive, employers and governments had to seek 
massive productivity increases, which often resulted in even m ore publicly- 
funded early retirement.
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The welfare sta te  in retreat
Since the early 1980s the welfare state has been in retreat.  Only a few 
governments, especially in Britain and the USA, a t tem pted  to  cut back on 
social security spending. But ageing, low em ploym ent and  public debt 
forced welfare states to restructure. The Treaty o f  M aastr ich t  and the sub­
sequent Stability and G row th  Pact had similar consequences for E uropean  
welfare states.
T he  retreat o f  the welfare state has am bivalent implications for trade 
unions. To the extent tha t  t rade  un ions were em bedded  in the welfare state, 
re trenchm ent is a threat to their established role in social policy. Where 
trade  unions partic ipate in the adm inistra tion  o f  welfare state programmes, 
this has com e under  criticism in recent years, like for example in Austria, 
France, G erm any  and the Netherlands. W hereas in some cases employers 
have pressed for change, in o thers governm ents have taken the initiative and 
tried to curtail the role o f  the ‘social p a r tn e rs ’ in the governance o f  the 
welfare state. In A ustria  and  Italy this was seen as an at tack  on  trade un io n ­
ism as such and  has  led to a call for protest strikes, in par t icu lar  to the first 
general strike for two decades in Italy in 2002 (Ebbinghaus, 2002.).
O n the o ther  hand , res tructuring o f  the welfare state expanded  the space 
for collective bargaining (Myles and  Pierson, 2001; Schludi, 2001; Swank, 
2001; Ebbinghaus and  Hassel, 2000). For instance, the gradual re trench­
m ent o f  pay-as-you-go pension schemes on the European  con t inen t has 
opened up opportunit ies  for bargain ing on occupational pensions. In the 
Netherlands, F rance and  Sweden have existed for a long time. T hey  nego­
tiated supplem entary  pensions increased in im portance  with the cu tback  of  
universal state pension schemes. In o ther  countries where trade unions had 
no tradition  o f  negotiat ing  private pensions, they have started  to do  so. The 
G e rm a n  pension reform o f  2001 introduced new volunta ry  private pension 
funds to  supplem ent declining public benefits. This has  led to collective 
agreements on funded occupational pension schemes and the conversion of  
parts  o f  the wage into insurance contribu tions (Ebbinghaus, 2002.).
T rade un ion  inclusion in econom ic policy and  social security provision 
survived in Western E u rope  mainly because o f  the close connect ion  
between the m atu re  welfare state and  the labour market.  For m any  govern­
m ents it becam e ap p a ren t  in the 1980s and  1990s tha t labour  m arke t  d e r ­
egulation in m a tu re  welfare states is politically risky and expensive. M ature  
welfare states no t  only o iler multiple veto po in ts  to social g roups  u n d e r ­
tak ing  to obs truc t  deregulation  and  re trenchm ent (Pierson, 1998). Social 
security provision has also becom e a m ain  source o f  legitimacy for govern ­
m ents  in an  unstable world economy. In many countries, in pa r t icu la r  on 
the European  cont inen t ,  trade  unions have used their  influence on the 
welfare state to take r e d u n d a n t  workers out o f  the labour m arke t  rather
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than  make them  unem ployed. U nem ploym ent is still seen by the public 
and by policy makers as the main b enchm ark  for econom ic policy. Even in 
countries  with liberal welfare states where trade unions are n o t  involved in 
the design and  adm inis tra t ion  o f  social securing program m es, the politics 
o f  re trenchm ent were difficult for neo-liberal governm ents  like those  of  
R onald  R eagan in the USA , and  M a rga re t  T h a tch er  in the U K  (Pierson, 
1994).
6. New challenges
In the last two decades o f  the twentieth century, new challenges arose for 
organized labour in the politics o f  advanced industrialized countries. The 
architecture o f  the world econom y had  changed fundam entally  since the 
early 1970s with the b reakdow n  o f  the Bretton W oods system and the rise 
o f  in te rnationa l capital markets. E conom ic liberalization, privatization 
and deregulation  spread across the world, and protected niches o f  em ploy­
m ent in state-run industries were eradicated. In Europe, the Single 
E uropean  M arket,  M one tary  U nion  and the Stability and G row th  Pact 
cemented the tu rn  to  austerity  and  tight m onetarism . L abour  markets 
became m ore volatile, insecure and  heterogeneous. Party systems u n d e r ­
went fundam ental changes as they dissociated themselves from trad itional 
class cleavages (Kitschelt, 1997). T rade union m em bersh ip  declined and in 
many countries the cohesion o f  the t rade  union m ovem ent as a political 
ac tor  is in doubt.
Transnational economic policy
With econom ic internationalization , the in terdependence between national 
economies has increased. N ational econom ic policies p roduce s tronger 
external effects than  before and they are m ore  than  ever subject to  in te rna­
tional regulation. Increasingly, in te rnational agencies and  suprana tiona l 
bodies regulate or, for tha t matter, deregulate m arket access and  trade and 
capital flows. In tergovernmental bodies tha t operate in an in ternational 
space derive their legitimacy from the cooperation  o f  sovereign govern­
ments. Union influence on them is generally low. N either  the In ternational 
M o ne ta ry  F und  nor  the World Trade O rganization  provide opportun ities  
for un ion  participation.
The internationalization o f  capital m arkets
T h e  in ternationa liza t ion  o f  capita l m arke ts  pu ts  a p rem ium  on price 
stability. U n d er  flexible exchange rates the  value o f  a currency  depends  on 
the rate o f  inflation an d  the cu r ren t  a c c o u n t  balance. N a t io n a l  m o n e ta ry  
and fiscal policy m akers  therefore have to  take the effects o f  wage infla­
tion on the exchange rate  in to  accoun t .  A s the  ability o f  governm ents  to
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to lera te  wage inflation is d im inished, un ions  com e u n d e r  p ressure to 
co ope ra te  in ad jus ting  national la b o u r  m ark e ts  to the new in te rna tiona l  
constra in ts .
A t the same time, governm ents have reasons to  seek new forms o f  c o o p ­
era tion  with trade  unions in their effort to  ad just to the new econom ic envi­
ronm ent.  In par t icu lar  in countries where labour m arke ts  are still highly 
regulated and  the role o f  t rade  unions in wage form ation is strong, govern­
m ents  try to persuade t rade  unions to accept vo lun tary  wage restraint.  
Depending  on un ions’ ability to mobilize electoral pressure, governments 
have an  incentive to  p reem pt union opposit ion  through  negotiations. The 
interest o f  governm ents in tr iparti te  agreements on  wages and welfare state 
reform opens new opportun it ies  for trade union political influence. In 
countries where trade unions are weak in political,  institutional and o rgan ­
izational terms, governm ents  increasingly tend to exclude them from polit­
ical decision making.
Europeanization
In the European U nion  the process o f  econom ic and  m one ta ry  integration 
has m ade a tight m one ta ry  policy and fiscal austerity  an  in ternational obli­
gation for m em ber  states. The M aastr ich t  Treaty and  the Stability and 
G row th  Pact have tied the hands  o f  national governments. Econom ic 
governance, as envisaged by the French governm ent,  is underdeveloped in 
com parison  to the role o f  the au to n o m o u s  E uropean  Central Bank.
Still, European  integration has always entailed an  element o f  social p a r t ­
nership and  tr ipartism. Like m ost o f  the C on tinen ta l  European  m em ber  
states, the EU has a tr iparti te  Econom ic and Social C om m ittee  on which 
unions are represented. Moreover, the E uropean  Union  has long been c o m ­
mitted to ‘social d ia logue’ between business and  labour (Falkner, 1998), 
and the European  em ploym ent strategy em phasizes the inclusion o f  unions 
at the suprana tiona l as well as the national level.
As o f  now the im pact o f  E u ropean  social policy has remained limited. 
European  social policy directives, written with m ore or  less involvement o f  
the E uropean  Trade Union C onfederation ,  cover only narrow  issues and  do 
no t substantia lly  affect national labour or social legislation. European- 
wide collective barga in ing  is a long way off and indeed seems unlikely ever 
to materialize (see C h a p te r  13 by Sadowski, Ludewig and  Turk in this 
volume). Despite the preferential trea tm en t o f  the social par tne rs  by the 
European  Com m ission , the E uropean  political system is much m ore  p lu ­
ralist than  co rpora tis t  (Streeck, 1992). A  large num ber  o f  t rade  unions, 
associations, lobby groups, firms and  regions have a variety o f  choices o f  
different paths  o f  access to the political centre, and policy m ak ing  is o rg a­
nized around  a complex interplay between the national and  E uropean  level.
362 International handbook o f  trade unions
European  decision m akers  have a variety o f  interest groups to  deal with, 
t rade unions being only one am o n g  many (Streeck, 1993b).
Trade unions as political actors
In postw ar  Europe  and  beyond, unions were included in national politics 
as representatives o f  the working class as a whole. In the 1970s in pa r t icu ­
lar, their m em bersh ip  grew and  so did their political influence. However, 
deep changes in the com position  o f  trade union m em bersh ip  have taken 
place since. In m ost  countries, un ion m em bersh ip  has declined subs tan ­
tially an d  its s tructure became stuck in the golden era  o f  welfare state 
expansion. By the end o f  the twentieth century, the average union m em ber  
was older than the average employee; m ore likely to be a blue-collar worker 
than  a white-collar worker; male rather  th a n  female; and  employed in m a n ­
ufacturing ra ther  than in services (see C h a p te r  2 by Schnabel and  C hap te r
11 by Visser in this volume). In particular, the increase in female and  service 
sector em ploym ent is no t reflected in trade union membership. Such im ba l­
ances are likely to  have long-term negative effects on  the political legitimacy 
o f  trade unions. For  example, established rights o f  unions to be represented 
on public com mittees and  administra tive boards  may be increasingly cha l­
lenged by a sceptical public.
Even m ore im portan t ,  the political interests o f  unions will naturally  be 
defined by their  rem aining core membership. T he  massive expansion o f  
early retirement in the 1980s and  1990s reflected the dem ands  o f  older trade 
union members. Trade unions in Italy, where up  to  50 per cent o f  union 
m em bers  are retired, cam paign  for pensioners rights at the expense o f  
young workers (Ebbinghaus, 2002). D espite the effort o f  m any trade unions 
to b roaden  their  m em bership  base, unions as political ac tors are likely to 
be increasingly defined as a pressure g roup  for a narrow  constituency of  
skilled m anual workers. This will m ake  it difficult for them to defend the 
political status they achieved in the postw ar  period, which is still reflected 
in m any o f  the core institu tions o f  dem ocratic  capitalism.
Present tendencies towards deregulation  o f  advanced political econo ­
mies may, however, be overstated. In m any E uropean  countries trade 
unions are still s trong (Ross and  M art in ,  1999). T hey  generally continue to 
be regarded by m any governm ents as indispensable partic ipan ts  in national 
social pacts  for wage m odera t ion  and em ployment. O n the o ther  hand , even 
where postw ar corpora tism  is n o t  d isappearing,  it is changing  under  pres­
sures on governments to  s trengthen econom ic incentives and  ensure that 
the costs o f  the organized pursuit  o f  collective interests are borne by those 
who also reap the benefits, ra ther  than  by the  public-at-large.
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